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Abstract
This paper improves upon recent game-theoretic
deceptive signaling schemes for cyber defense using
the insights emerging from a cognitive model of human
cognition. One particular defense allocation algorithm
that uses a deceptive signaling scheme is the peSSE
(Xu et al., 2015). However, this static signaling scheme
optimizes the rate of deception for perfectly rational
adversaries and is not personalized to individuals.
Here we advance this research by developing a
dynamic and personalized signaling scheme using
cognitive modeling. A cognitive model based on a
theory of experiential-choice (Instance-Based Learning
Theory; IBLT), implemented in a cognitive architecture
(Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational; ACT-R), and
validated using human experimentation with deceptive
signals informs the development of a cognitive
signaling scheme. The predictions of the cognitive
model show that the proposed solution increases the
compliance to deceptive signals beyond the peSSE.
These predictions were verified in human experiments,
and the results shed additional light on human
reactions towards adaptive deceptive signals.

1. Introduction
In cybersecurity, static defense strategies (e.g.,
intrusion detection, firewalls, anti-malware, or antivirus) are effective front-line defenses that prevent
many attacks. Despite their effectiveness, many attacks
still succeed as adversaries continuously adapt to find
and exploit new vulnerabilities. It is imperative to
develop security defenses that thwart attacks before
they occur and that adapt to ever-evolving adversaries.
One way to actively prevent attacks is to employ
signaling schemes based on game-theoretic algorithms.
Security analysists can actively monitor a network
for fraudulent activity. However, resources are often
limited, and a network cannot be fully monitored all
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the time, therefore signaling can aid in protecting
unprotected resources. Signaling is a defense method
whereby information is sent to an attacker that reveals
the protection status of a potential target. Truthful
signals can deter some attacks, but employing
deceptive tactics can increase the perceived coverage
of unprotected targets by finding the correct balance
between truthful and deceptive signals [1].
Deception is a form of persuasion where one
intentionally misleads an agent into a false belief, in
order to gain an advantage over the agent and achieve
one’s goals [2]. Deception is often used for ill-gains,
for example, in spear-phishing attacks or
disinformation campaigns. However, it can also be
used for good, to mitigate unwanted behavior or illegal
activity, much like signage in a front lawn may deter
would-be thieves even if no physical security system
truly exists. In cybersecurity, deceptive signals can be
used to deter attacks on uncovered systems beyond any
capabilities of static defenses that do not use signaling
or only use truthful signals.
Finding the right balance of deceptive signaling so
that the attacker continues to believe the signal is
crucial to the success of the strategy. Recently, gametheoretic research on deceptive signaling algorithms in
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) has optimized the
strategic allocation of limited defenses and the rate of
deception so that a rational attacker would not attack
when presented a signal [3]. However, this research
optimized signaling for perfectly rational adversaries,
and humans exhibit, at best, bounded rationality [4].
Deception is a tool used to trick the human mind,
and as such, a better understanding of how would-be
attackers react to and learn from deceptive tactics is
important for developing effective cyber defenses. To
these ends, we examined human behavior in a cybersecurity game called the Insider Attack Game (IAG)
that pits humans, who play the role of an insideattacker, against cybersecurity analysts controlled by
an algorithm. Results of laboratory experiments, and a
cognitive model that accurately predicts human
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performance in the IAG, show that humans behave far
differently than predicted under assumptions of perfect
rationality [1][5-7]. Humans exhibit nominally
irrational behaviors that reflect capacity and
information limitations, and the need to resort to
heuristic strategies, that result in cognitive biases (e.g.,
confirmation bias). While signaling algorithms
optimized for perfectly rational adversaries do improve
defense compared to not signaling at all [3], they are
less than effective against boundedly rational humans.
One reason for the algorithms’ shortcomings is that
they are static and not personalized to individuals.
While humans are not perfectly rational, they learn
quickly and can adjust behavior in real time. A
signaling scheme that is adaptive to the individual can
potentially outperform traditional signaling schemes.
Based on our understanding of human behavior
response to deceptive signaling in the IAG, through
experimentation and cognitive modeling, we propose a
signaling scheme that is adaptive to an individual’s
experience. The signaling scheme is designed to both
exploit and maintain the attacker’s belief in the signal.
In what follows, we first describe a signaling
scheme that is optimized for and effective against
perfectly rational adversaries, and how an approach
based on cognitive modeling would differ. Next, we
describe an online game that was developed to
investigate human behavior response to deceptive
signaling. Results from humans playing the game, and
a cognitive model that accurately predicts their
performance, provide key insights that lead to the
design of a signaling scheme that is grounded in
principles of human cognition. The scheme is
predicted, via the cognitive model, to be more effective
against boundedly rational humans than traditional
schemes. The results of a laboratory experiment show
that the signaling scheme is effective at increasing
compliance with the signal compared to traditional
schemes, but humans still attack more often than
predicted by the model. The human behavior results
are compared with those of the cognitive model to shed
light on human response to deceptive signals, guide
avenues of future research, and aid in the development
of more effective signaling schemes.

2. Deceptive signaling for cybersecurity
In cybersecurity, deception has been adopted across
many security techniques with much success, for
example, in the strategic allocation of honeypots [8]
and masking the properties of systems [9]. Using
deceptive signals in Stackelberg Security Games also
has great potential for use in cybersecurity.
SSGs model the interaction between an attacker
and a defender using a game-theoretic framework. In

the SSG, a defender plays a particular strategy (i.e.,
random patrolling of an airport terminal), the attacker
observes the strategy, and then the attacker takes
action. Under this framework, researchers have
developed algorithms, such as the Strong Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SSE), that optimally allocates limited
defense resources across a set of targets [10]. These
algorithms have been applied successfully across a
number of physical security systems (e.g., protecting
ports, scheduling air marshals, and mitigating
poachers) [10-13]. Such security practices could be
applied to the cyber realm, for example, in scheduling
active monitoring of security systems by network
administrators (e.g., security analysts).
Xu and colleagues [3] extended the SSG models by
incorporating elements of signaling, in which a
defender (sender) strategically reveals information
about their strategy to the attacker (receiver) in order to
influence the attacker’s decision making [14-15].
Sending a message that reveals the protection status of
target can influence attacker behavior. For example, a
truthful message that reveals a target is monitored can
deter attacks, but adversaries can attack with impunity
when a message reveals the target is not monitored.
However, defenders can use a combination of truthful
and deceptive signals to help deter attacks on the
unprotected resources. Xu et al.’s [3] solution, the
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium with Persuasion
(peSSE), improves defense against a perfectly rational
attacker compared to strategies that do not use
signaling. For a given target, the peSSE finds the
optimal combination of bluffing (sending a deceptive
message that the target is monitored when it is not) and
truth-telling (sending a truthful message that the target
is covered) so that a rational attacker would not attack
in the presence of a signal.
In practice, the SSE allocates defenses
proportionally across the set of targets so that the
expected values of all targets are equal. Once defenses
are scheduled, the attacker can choose a target to
attack. Then, as determined by the peSSE, the defender
will send a signal to the attacker revealing the
protection status of the target, which may sometimes
be deceptive. Based on this information, the attacker
can then choose to continue the attack or withdraw. If
the attacker continues the attack, then they will receive
a penalty if the target is truly monitored, but a reward
if the target is open. The peSSE sends deceptive
signals at a rate that makes the expected value of
attacking a target, given a signal, equal to the expected
value of withdrawing the attack, or zero. Therefore,
under the assumption of perfect rationality, when
presented with a signal an attacker will always break
ties in favor of the defender and choose the safer
option, to withdraw the attack.
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Figure 1. Screenshot of the IAG (A) and an example signal message (B).
Unfortunately, the peSSE is less than optimal
against humans that do not always make the rational
best decision [6-7]. The signaling scheme can be
improved by taking into account cognitive dynamics
and biases that influence decisions making. What is
needed for a cognitive-based signaling scheme is a
computational or mathematical model of human
reactions in all circumstances. The adaptive scheme
can then use that model to dynamically optimize signal
presentation given previous events and responses.

3. Insider Attack Game
The Insider Attack Game (IAG) is an online game
designed to investigate the interaction between an
attacker and defender in a cybersecurity scenario, gain
a better understanding of how humans react to
deceptive signals, and assess the effectiveness of
various signaling schemes [5][7]. Figure 1(A) shows a
screenshot of the game interface. Players take the role
of the attacker at the center of the screen (i.e., a
company employee) and their goal is to score points by
“hacking” computers to steal proprietary data. There
are six computers from which to choose to attack, but
only two security analysts (i.e., defenders controlled by
a computer algorithm) that can monitor one computer
each. If the player attacks a computer that is monitored,
they lose points denoted by the number of red stars, but
if the computer is not monitored then they win points
denoted by the number of yellow stars. Each computer
shows its reward for winning, penalty for losing, and
the probability that the computer is being monitored
(which reflects the SSE for the game).
Players make repeated attempts at attacking
computers. On each turn, the player must first select a
computer to attack. Then, the signaling algorithm

determines whether to send a truthful signal or a
deceptive signal. In the IAG with six targets and two
analysts, the peSSE presents a signal every time a
target is monitored, or 33% of trials on average.
Additionally, the peSSE sends a signal half of the time
when a target is not monitored, or 33% of trials on
average. This means that, on average, a signal is
deceptive half of the time. At this rate, the expected
value of attacking given a signal is zero, the same
expected value as withdrawing the attack. Therefore, a
perfectly rational adversary that only attacks with a
positive expected value (i.e., in the absence of a
signal), is predicted to attack on 33% of trials on
average (i.e., when a signal is not presented).
Figure 1(B) shows an example message signaling
that a target is currently being monitored. If the
computer is not being monitored, then the first line of
the message is omitted. After reading the message, the
player must decide whether to continue their attack or
withdraw and earn zero points. Players play four
rounds of 25 trials each (after an initial five trials of
practice). The payoff structures and monitoring
probabilities of the targets are different in each round.
Coverage and signaling of targets were precomputed
for each trial. Therefore, each individual player
experiences the same coverage and signaling schedule.

3.1. Understanding human behavior in the IAG
Cranford et al. [6-7] presented the results of 100
human participants playing the IAG against the peSSE
signaling scheme and a cognitive model of an attacker
that accurately predicts human performance and helps
explain human behavior.
Figure 2 shows the mean probability of attack
across trials. The dashed line at the bottom of the graph
shows the predicted probability of attack of a perfectly
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rational adversary (33%). The results showed that
humans attacked far more often than predicted, almost
80% of trials. Figure 3 displays the probability of
attack on trials when a signal is presented, showing
that humans attack more than 70% of trials while a
perfectly rational adversary would never attack.

Figure 2. Mean probability of attack across trials and
rounds in the IAG for humans compared to the
model, playing against the peSSE.

Figure 3. Mean probability of attack when a signal is
present, comparing humans and model playing the
IAG against the peSSE.
It is clear that humans do not make perfectly
rational decisions. Instead, human behavior can be
explained as decisions from experience [16]. To better
understand the cognitive process underlying human
decision making, a cognitive model was built in the
ACT-R cognitive architecture [17-18] and decisions
are made following instance-based learning theory
(IBLT) [16]. According to IBLT, decisions are made
by generalizing across past experiences, or instances,
that are similar to the current situation. For the IAG,
instances are represented by the features of the
decision. This includes the context of the selected
target, the decision, and the outcome. The context
includes the monitoring probability [0.0, 1.0], reward
[1, 10], and penalty values [-1, -10] associated with the
selected target, and whether a warning signal was
presented [present, absent]. The possible decisions are
attack or withdraw, and the outcome is the reward or
penalty based on the decision. In a given situation, for
each possible decision, an associated utility is
computed through blended memory retrieval weighted
by contextual similarity to past instances. The decision

with the highest expected utility is made. However,
withdrawing always results in zero points. Therefore,
the model only needs to determine the utility of
attacking in order to make a choice.
In ACT-R, the retrieval of past instances is based
on the activation strength of the relevant instance in
memory and its similarity to the current context. The
activation of an instance reflects the power law of
practice and forgetting, and includes a partial matching
process reflecting the similarity between the current
context elements and the corresponding context
elements for the instance in memory. A variance
parameter s introduces stochasticity in retrieval.
Similarities between numeric slot values are computed
on a linear scale from 0.0, an exact match, to -1.0.
Symbolic values are either an exact match or
maximally different, -2.5, to prevent bleeding between
memories for different actions and signal types.
A Boltzmann softmax equation determines the
probability of retrieving an instance based on its
activation strength. The IBL model uses ACT-R’s
blending mechanism [16][19] to calculate an expected
outcome of attacking a target based on a consensus of
past instances. The expected outcome is the value that
best satisfies the constraints of all matching instances
weighted by their probability of retrieval.
In summary, the outcomes of past instances are
weighted by their recency, frequency, and similarity to
the current instance to produce an expected outcome. If
the value is greater than zero then the model attacks,
else it withdraws.
For each trial, the model first selects a target with
the highest expected outcome, generated via blending,
and then decides whether to continue the attack or
withdraw based on whether a signal was presented. For
this decision, the model uses blending to generate an
expected outcome for the given target, but only on the
basis of the signal and ignores the values of the target
context (i.e., the target information is occluded from
the participants, so it is plausible that they do not
consider the target information beyond deciding which
target to select initially). An instance is then saved in
memory that represents the model’s expected outcome.
Humans tend to remember not only the actual
experience, but also their expectations prior to the
experience [20]. This results in additional positive (or
negative) instances, which in turn generates a
confirmation bias whereby one’s pre-conception of
winning (or losing) perpetuates itself in future trials,
even when it is actually disconfirmed. Based on the
value of the expected outcome, a decision is made, and
the action and outcome slots of the current instance are
updated to reflect the action taken by the model and the
ground-truth outcome. This final instance is saved in
memory and thereby influences future decisions.
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The model continues for four rounds of 25 trials
each. The model behavior reflects its experiences. If an
action results in a positive/negative outcome, then its
future expectations will be increased/decreased, and
the model will be more/less likely to select and attack
that target in the future. Also, the impact of a particular
past experience on future decisions strengthens with
frequency and weakens with time.
The model was run 1000 times to simulate a
population of individuals and to generate stable
estimates of human performance. As shown in Figures
2 and 3, the model is highly accurate at predicting
human performance (total RMSE = 0.04), even
matching the trial-to-trial variations that reflect the
underlying coverage and signaling schedules (total r =
0.73), and that accuracy increases over time. Not only
does the model match the average human performance
in the IAG, but it also matches well to the individual
performance. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
participants by their mean probability of attack. Like
humans, some model simulations attack at a fairly low
rate, while a large proportion attack 95% of the time or
more. Figure 5 shows the distribution for when a signal
present, and indicates that some participants comply
with the signal, to a degree, while most do not.

Figure 4. Distribution of participants by probability of
attack for humans compared to the model playing
the IAG against the peSSE.

Figure 5. Distribution of participants by probability of
attack when a signal is present, comparing humans
and model playing the IAG against the peSSE.

Human decision making in the IAG is largely
influenced by memory dynamics across past
experiences. The peSSE suffers because human biases
(e.g., recency, frequency, and confirmation) lead to
overweighting of certain outcomes that, often, results
in inflated expectations. Humans fail to fully comply
with the signal because they are more likely to expect a
positive outcome than a negative one as belief in the
signal deteriorates. While deception is an effective tool
for preventing malicious behaviors, the experience of
successfully calling a bluff can reduce compliance with
the signal. Regaining trust in the signal is difficult if
not impossible to do under static signaling schemes.
Therefore, an adaptive signaling scheme is needed that
adjusts the rate of deception to dynamically balance
(re)building trust in the signal and exploiting it, and
thus optimizes compliance.

4. Cognitive signaling scheme for adaptive
cyber defense
Individual attackers behave differently from one
another, and each may learn and adjust behavior after
repeated experience with deceptive signals. Therefore,
an adaptive signaling scheme based on cognitive
principles can be used to adjust the rate of deception,
tailored to an individual’s behavior, so as to maintain
belief in the signal. Our initial solution towards this
problem is to interleave blocks of trials with only
truthful signals between blocks of trials with deceptive
signals. The assumption is that experiences of rewards
when a signal is present increases the probability of
attacking in the future, while experiences of penalties
given a signal reduces the probability of attacking in
the future. Therefore, eliminating deceptive signals for
a short period of time can help increase penalties and
restore belief in the signal. The goal for the cognitive
signaling scheme is to induce, and preserve, the belief
that attacking given a signal will result in a loss.
Relying on the attacker’s history of behavior, this
new cognitive signaling scheme estimates the current
probability of attack given a signal and judges whether
the cost of issuing a truthful block outweighs the
benefits of a deceptive block, to effectively reduce the
future probability of attack given a signal. At the
beginning of each block of trials, a closed form
equation of the current probability of attack given a
signal, reflecting the blending process used in
generating expectations and the recency and frequency
power laws in chunk activations, can be formulated
based on the times t since past actual decisions made
by the attacker, as:
𝑛𝑜𝑤
𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑆 =

𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 −𝑑
𝑡𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑗−𝑑
𝑖
𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 −𝑑
𝑡𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑗−𝑑 + 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑠
𝑘
𝑖
𝑗

𝑡𝑘−𝑑

(1)
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Next, we estimate the change in probability of
attack given a signal from a truthful block. Therefore,
we need to make an additional assumption as to how
wins and losses impact choice. We assume that the
attacker will follow the same decision-making process,
keeping the same format reflecting probability
matching behavior:
𝑛𝑜𝑤
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝑆 =

𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 −𝑑
𝑡𝑖
𝑖
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 −𝑑
𝑒𝑠 −𝑑
𝑡𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑡𝑗
𝑖
𝑗

(2)

The impact of a truthful block of size b on
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛
𝑛𝑜𝑤
𝐴 𝑆 with
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝐴 𝑆 results in a new estimate 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑜𝑤
an expected number 1/3 ∗ 𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴 𝑆 of losses
distributed randomly across the block, where 1/3 is the
mean probability of sending a signal in a truthful
block. For the present implementation, the block size b
is set to 10. This value was chosen as a reasonable
compromise that provides enough opportunities for
switching blocks while allowing for enough experience
within a block to impact behavior.
The adaptive cognitive signaling scheme is as
follows: the next block will use a truthful signal if the
following comparison of the cost in terms of additional
attacks allowed in the next block is less than its
benefits (i.e., the number of attacks saved in the
remaining r trials during the rest of the experiment
after that block):
1
𝑛𝑜𝑤
∗ 𝑏 ∗ 1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑆
3
𝑛𝑜𝑤
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛
< 𝛼 ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝐴 𝑆 − 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝐴𝑆

(3)

Where 1/3 is the difference in probability of a signal
being generated between deceptive (66%) and truthful
blocks (33%), and  is a discount parameter that can
take any value between 0.0 and 1.0 (default is 1/3). The
discount parameter is an assumption of how long the
impact of the truthful block on the probability of attack
given a signal will persist. If we assume that it will
persist until the end and all future blocks will be
deceptive blocks, then the right value would be 2/3
(i.e., the percentage of trials when a signal is
generated). If it would persist indefinitely but all future
blocks are truthful blocks, then that value would be
1/3. In practice, it will be somewhere between 1/3 and
2/3 depending of the mix of truthful and deceptive. The
effect of the signal will dilute over time, so the
minimum 1/3 is a reasonable default value.
In summary, the cognitive signaling scheme uses a
closed form version of the model decision procedure to
optimize the tradeoff between the cost of building trust
in the signal using blocks of truthful signals, and the
benefits of exploiting that trust in future blocks of
deceptive signals.

4.1. Cognitive model predictions and human
performance against cognitive signaling
The effectiveness of the cognitive signaling scheme
was examined through cognitive model simulations
and a human behavioral experiment. The cognitive
model of the attacker presented above was run through
1000 simulations against the cognitive signaling
scheme, and these predictions were then compared to
performance of human participants. For the human
experiment, 100 participants were recruited via
Amazon Mechanical Turk. All participants resided in
the United States. For completing the experiment and
submitting a completion code, participants were paid
$1 plus $0.01 per point earned in the game, up to a
maximum of $5.50. One participant was removed from
analysis because of incomplete data due to data
recording errors, resulting in a final N of 99. For
brevity, details of the experimental design can be found
in Cranford et al. [7].
As an initial study, all players began with a block
of truthful signals to establish baseline belief in the
signal. As before, players played four rounds of trials
each, with a different set of targets each round. Every
10 trials overall the algorithm determined whether to
switch to a different type of block: either using only
truthful signals or using deception according to the
peSSE. Figure 6 shows the proportion of players that
received a truthful block, across each of the 10 blocks
in the game. The first block is always a truthful block.
From there, depending on the individual’s behavior,
the cognitive signaling scheme assigns more truthful or
deceptive blocks. The second block is always
deceptive, and the third block is about evenly divided
between truthful and deceptive. Over time, the
proportion of truthful blocks declines because the
estimated reduction in future probability of attack over
the remaining blocks does not outweigh the near-term
term costs of the truthful block. Overall, the probability
of assigning truthful blocks is higher for humans than
for the model, suggesting that humans are less trusting
in the signal and more willing to attack.

Figure 6. Proportion of truthful blocks assigned by
the cognitive signaling scheme per block of 10 trials
for humans compared to the model.
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To assess human and model performance, the data
was analyzed for the probability of attack across trials.
The probability of attack was calculated as the
proportion of players that continued the attack on a
given trial. Figure 7 shows the probability of attack
across trials for humans compared to the model when
playing against the cognitive signaling scheme, which
is compared to human performance when playing
against the peSSE. Compared to the peSSE, the
cognitive signaling scheme further reduces the
probability of attack, but at the expense of giving up
more attacks in the first block. Because all signals are
truthful in the first block of the cognitive signaling
condition, fewer signals are sent to deter attacks
overall. The effect of an initial truthful block is
immediately observable by a relatively lower
probability of attack in trials 10 through 20 (which is
always a deceptive block), and this trend continues
through the game. The effect of the cognitive signaling
scheme is more prominent in the model. As can be
seen, humans attack more often than predicted by the
model. Because humans tend to attack more than the
model, the cognitive signaling scheme also presents
more truthful blocks to humans (see Figure 6 above).
To assess the effectiveness of the signaling scheme,
we examine defender utility. The defender is penalized
one point every time the player attacks a target that is
not monitored, and zero points otherwise (e.g., if a
player attacks a target that is monitored, or does not
attack). This means, the more often players attack in
the face of a deceptive signal, the worse will be
defender utility. Since targets are not monitored 66%
of trials on average, a defender utility less than -17
(i.e., >2/3 of 25 trials) means the signaling scheme is
better than a purely truthful signaling scheme, while a
utility greater than -9 is ideal (i.e., <1/3 of 25 trials).
While the cognitive signaling scheme reduces attacks,
as displayed in Figure 8, defender utility is only
marginally improved compared to the peSSE and much
lower compared to model predictions. Compared to the
model and the peSSE, more truthful signals were given
to humans overall under cognitive signaling. This
resulted in fewer signals sent to deter attacks on
uncovered targets and consequently more free passes to
attack with impunity, even though overall compliance
with the signal is increased.
At first glance, these results indicate that the
cognitive signaling scheme is not as effective as
predicted. However, a closer inspection of the results
revealed that the scheme is effective at influencing
human behavior beyond the peSSE, for some humans.
As shown in the histogram in Figure 9, the model fails
to account for approximately 44% of participants that
attacked at a rate of 95% or more. However, as shown
in Figure 10, if we separate participants into two

Figure 7. Mean probability of attack across trials and
rounds in the IAG for humans and the model playing
against the cognitive signaling scheme, which are
compared to humans playing against the peSSE.

Figure 8. Defender utility for the cognitive signaling
scheme compared to the peSSE.

Figure 9. Distribution of participants by probability of
attack for humans compared to the model playing
the IAG against the cognitive signaling scheme.

Figure 10. Mean probability of attack across trials
and rounds in the IAG for humans compared to the
model playing against the cognitive signaling scheme,
separating humans that attack >=95% and <95%.
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groups, the model is highly accurate at predicting
performance of the approximately 56% of participants
that attack at a rate less than 95%.
For the participants that attacked at a rate greater
than 95%, the cognitive signaling scheme did not
influence behavior even after giving these participants,
almost exclusively, truthful blocks. Figure 11 shows
the proportion of truthful blocks assigned per block of
10 trials for the two separate groups. The cognitive
signaling scheme presented the same proportion of
truthful blocks to the model as it did those participants
that attacked less than 95% of the time. However, the
scheme continued to present truthful blocks to the
other group of participants because they continued
attacking undeterred in the face of a signal.

Figure 11. Proportion of truthful blocks assigned by
the cognitive signaling scheme per block of 10 trials
comparing the model to humans that attack >=95%
and to those that attack <95%.

conducted with two independent coders, and the
responses were categorized based on the features in
which decisions were based or the reported actions
taken. Discrepancies between coders were resolved
through discussion. The results are presented in Figure
13 comparing responses of participants that attacked
greater than 95% to those that attacked less than 95%.
For the former group, almost 23% reported that they
ignored the signal while another ~10% reported that
they always attacked. Approximately 10% reported
that they stay and continue attacking the same target
even after suffering a loss, while about 15% switch to
another target and continue attacking. Meanwhile, for
the latter group, none reported that they ignore the
signal, while approximately 20% reported that they
withdraw in the face of a signal, and ~12% withdraw if
the monitoring probability was high. Overall, the
survey results show that some participants ignore the
signal and treat all instances equally. This means that
the signaling scheme will not be effective against these
participants because the expected value of attacking
given a signal is combined with the expected value of
attacking given no signal. Therefore, with only 2
analysts, the overall expected values would be positive,
resulting in constant attacks.

As shown in Figure 12, the cognitive signaling
scheme provides better defense for a subset of humans,
as indicated by low defender utility values that match
what was predicted by the model. However, against
some participants the scheme performs about as poorly
as would be expected given no signals.
Figure 13. Distribution of reported attack strategies
in the IAG for humans that attack >=95%
compared to those that attack < 95%.

Figure 12. Defender utility for the cognitive signaling
scheme, comparing the model to humans that
attack >=95% and to those that attack <95%.
In fact, in a post-experiment survey that asked an
open-ended question about what strategy participants
used when faced with a signal, a majority of
participants that attacked more than 95% responded
that they ignored the signal. An informal analysis was

Based on these findings, we created a version of the
cognitive model that does not consider the signal when
generating an expected outcome of attacking the
selected target. For this version, blending samples
equally across past instances regardless of the signal,
and so only recency and frequency of past instances
play a role in decisions. The model attacks on 96.0% of
trials (SD = 15.1%), with 54% of simulations attacking
100% of trials and 35.8% attacking greater than 95%,
matching well to the distribution shown in Figure 9 of
the humans that attack >=95%, and the other measures
(see Figures 10-12). These results stress the importance
of understanding the features that individuals consider
in their decisions, since one’s representation of the
decision context strongly influences the chosen action.

Page 1892

5. General Discussion
In this paper, we improved upon traditional gametheoretic signaling schemes for cyber defense using a
computational model of human cognition. The peSSE
signaling scheme offers effective defense against
boundedly rational human adversaries compared to not
signaling. However, the algorithm optimizes the rate of
deception for perfectly rational adversaries, which
results in a static scheme that is not personalized to
individual attackers. Through experimentation and
cognitive modeling, we learned how humans respond
to deceptive signals, and developed a cognitive
signaling scheme that is adaptive and based on
cognitive principles. Cognitive model predictions
showed that the solution is promising at further
influencing human behavior beyond the capabilities of
the peSSE. These predictions were verified in human
experiments, and the results helped shed additional
light on individual differences in human behavior.
The cognitive model predicts human decisions are
made by aggregated retrieval across past experiences
based on the similarity to the current situation [16].
These decisions are influenced by frequency and
recency of past experiences, cognitive biases, and
representation of information in memory. These are the
core assumptions for the cognitive signaling scheme.
Two key insights gleaned from the cognitive model
regarding human behavior, are that: (1) decisions are
highly affected by confirmation bias, and (2) it is
important to consider what features the individual
factors in their decision. The cognitive signaling
scheme leveraged this information to induce bias and
influence human behavior. Specifically, by relying on
observations of actual human behavior, the cognitive
signaling scheme estimated the probability of attack
given a signal and, if it was too high, would send only
truthful signals for a period of time in an attempt to
rebuild trust in the signal and ultimately increase
compliance. Continued attacks given truthful signals
should strengthen the expectation that attacking in the
future, given a signal, will result in a loss.
An open question for the cognitive signaling
scheme is how long do we need to display truthful
signals to regain trust, and thus compliance? Currently,
the approach gives up some attacks early on with an
initial truthful block, but this is done in order to
increase belief in the signal for the rest of the
experiment. The algorithm only determines whether to
switch to a different type of signal after a block of 10
trials. Ten is a reasonable value, but the algorithm
could be called as often as every trial. The implications
of this are unclear at this point. It could result in too
few truthful signals in a row to impact behavior, or it
could help further personalize the scheme so that it is

better adapted to the individual. Future research is
aimed at exploring ways to optimize the proportion of
truthful to deceptive signals over a period of time.
Cranford et al. [7] showed that humans seem to
ignore the context of the selected target, and only
consider the signal when making decisions of whether
to continue to attack. This insight allowed us to
simplify the cognitive signaling scheme and focus on
reducing the overall probability of attack given a
signal, and not need to take into account individual
target values. Afterall, the SSE normalizes targets, so
their expected values are equal [10].
An important observation from the human
experiments was that the cognitive signaling scheme is
only effective for some participants, while others seem
to ignore the signal when making decisions. This
further highlights the importance of accurately
representing decision features. For participants that do
not consider the signal, all targets are treated equally.
Thus, trying to reduce the probability of attack given a
signal by adjusting the rate of deception may prove
fruitless when the overall expected values are positive
for all targets. An alternative, method to combat such
adversaries could be to shift coverage instead of, or in
addition to, adjusting the rate of deception. For
example, while it might be difficult or impossible to
extract attack preferences to influence behavior, it
might be possible to extract selection preferences and
shift coverage to induce more experiences of loss given
a signal. Driving the expected value of attacking to
negative values could result in attackers starting to pay
attention to the signal, which in turn would raise the
effectiveness of cognitive signaling. Future research is
aimed at exploring the potential of this method.
Another limitation of the current approach is that it
relies only on deceiving when given a signal.
Meanwhile, players can attack with impunity when no
signal is presented. An alternative approach is to use
deception two ways, when a signal is present and when
it is absent. In this way, the attacker can lose points
when a signal is absent, instilling further uncertainty in
their decisions. In fact, recent research explored several
game-theoretic algorithms that employ two-way
deception that proved better than one-way deception
against human participants [1]. Future research is
aimed at exploring the potential of using two-way
deception in the current cognitive signaling approach.
We have already used two-way deception in an
alternative cognitive signal scheme, but it has not been
tested against human participants [6]. In that scheme,
the cognitive model is used to trace human behavior in
real time to make predictions about the human’s
probability of attack given a signal, and determines on
a trial-to-trial basis whether to give a signal based on
the underlying coverage. The scheme shows potential,
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and the use of two-way signaling is an enhancement
over the current approach. Where the current approach
stands out is in the fact that it is a closed-form solution
that relies on a simplified version of the cognitive
model to make predictions of individual behavior.
However, there is room to refine the current cognitive
signaling approach through the discount parameter, the
size of the truthful block, and the assumptions
concerning the likelihood of various coverage
conditions. Future research will further explore the
complexities of the cognitive signaling scheme.
One caveat to these approaches is that they rely on
observing and tracking an individual’s behavior. In the
real world, it may prove difficult if not impossible to
track all, or even some, of an adversary’s actions.
Luckily the methods are robust and can be tailored to a
population, sub-group, or even a time-window of
attacks. While not as effective as at the individual
level, such a method could still reliably influence
human behavior.
In conclusion, we have outlined an initial approach
to deceptive signaling for cyber defense that relies on
cognitive models of attacker behavior to balance the
rate of deception in an attempt to keep belief in the
signal high. The cognitive signaling scheme is adaptive
and personalized, and can therefore be used to induce
biases and influence attackers to comply with the
signal beyond the capabilities of any static scheme.
Future research is aimed at improving upon the current
cognitive signaling scheme.
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